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Michael J. Wishnie† 
For a century before 1986,1 federal law permitted employers 
to hire undocumented immigrants.2 The Immigration Reform and 
Control Act of 1986 (“IRCA”) marked a sea change in immigration 
law by extending federal immigration regulation into the private 
workplace through the prohibition of employment of unauthorized 
immigrants. In the two decades since passage of this dramatic 
new ban, codified in the “employer sanctions” provisions of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), there has been almost 
no critical examination of its merits.3 Few commentators have 
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 1 Federal immigration regulation began in earnest in the 1880s and did not bar the 
hiring of undocumented immigrants until passage of the Immigration Reform and Con-
trol Act of 1986 (“IRCA”), Pub L No 99-603, 100 Stat 3359. 
 2 Sure-Tan, Inc v NLRB, 467 US 883, 893 (1984) (observing that it is not “a separate 
criminal offense for an alien to accept employment after entering this country illegally”); 
De Canas v Bica, 424 US 351, 360 (1976) (“at best,” federal immigration statutes dis-
played “peripheral concern with employment of illegal entrants”). Before IRCA, twelve 
states prohibited the “knowing” employment of undocumented immigrants, including 
California, the state with the largest undocumented population. See De Canas, 424 US at 
360 (rejecting preemption challenge to California statute penalizing employment of unau-
thorized immigrants); U.S. Immigration Policy and the National Interest: Staff Report of 
the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, 97th Cong, 1st Sess 565 n * 
(Apr 30, 1981) (“SCIRP Staff Report”). But there was no federal prohibition, and the 
states generally declined to enforce their own laws. SCIRP Staff Report at 565 n * (“As for 
the state laws, they have been enforced only in California and Kansas. In California, 
enforcement has been effectively suspended . . . . The sole case of successful prosecution 
occurred in Kansas in 1977 and resulted in a fine of $250 against an employer.”). 
 3 One important exception is David Bacon, a longtime and forceful critic. See, for 
example, David Bacon, Justice Deported, Am Prospect (Dec 14, 2006), available at 
<http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=justice_deported> (last visited August 6, 
2007) (“Unions and immigrants both need a bill that would mandate what they’ve advo-
cated since 1999—the repeal of employer sanctions . . . . [S]anctions deny basic labor 
rights to millions”). See also Muzaffar Chishti, Employer Sanctions Against Immigrant 
Workers, Working USA 74 (Mar-Apr, 2000), available at <http://www.prospect.org/cs/ 
 
 7/22/2007 11:59:13 PM 
194 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2007: 
analyzed whether sanctions achieve their twin purposes of deter-
ring illegal immigration and protecting United States workers. 
Nevertheless, all serious proposals for immigration reform now 
under debate assume the continuation and even intensification of 
the prohibition on employment of unauthorized immigrants. 
Congress’s enactment of employer sanctions followed many 
years of study by a bipartisan congressional committee, academic 
researchers, and non-governmental organizations, as well as the 
production of several extensive sets of policy recommendations.4 
Substantively, the employer sanctions provisions forbid an em-
ployer from “knowingly” hiring or employing any unauthorized 
worker. IRCA also created new paperwork requirements, obligat-
ing employers to examine an employee’s work authorization 
documents and complete a Form I-9 within three days of hire. 
Congress established civil and criminal penalties for violations of 
either the substantive prohibition on employment or the paper-
work requirements.5 Congress also repealed the “Texas proviso” 
that had shielded employers from criminal liability for employing 
unauthorized immigrants,6 and extended the criminal prohibi-
tion on the use of fraudulent documents in immigration matters 
to penalize their use in connection with private employment.7 In 
short, for the first time in our nation’s history, IRCA made em-
ployment of undocumented immigrants unlawful across the 
country.8 
  
articles?article=justice_deported> (last visited August 6, 2007) (stating that the employer-
sanctions law “has, ironically, become a highly useful tool in the hands of unscrupulous 
employers in their ability to suppress workers’ rights”). 
 4 Most significant was the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy 
(“SCIRP”), established by Congress in 1978, which completed its work in 1981. See U.S. 
Immigration Policy and the National Interest: The Final Report and Recommendations of 
the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy with Supplemental Views by 
Commissioners, 97th Cong, 1st Sess (Mar 1, 1981) (“SCIRP Final Report”). See also Im-
migration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Conference Report, 132 Cong Rec S16611, 
16614 (Oct 16, 1986) (statement of Senator Simpson) (IRCA was SCIRP’s “basic work 
product”). 
 5 IRCA § 101, codified at 8 USC § 1324a (2000) (prohibiting knowing employment of 
unauthorized workers and establishing criminal and civil penalties for violations). 
 6 As a result, employers are now criminally liable under the “harboring” statute, as 
well as the employer sanctions provisions, for employment of undocumented immigrants. 
See, for example, United States v Kim, 193 F3d 567, 573–74 (2d Cir 1999) (affirming 
criminal conviction of factory owner who knowingly employed undocumented workers for 
violation of harboring statute). 
 7 IRCA § 103, codified at 18 USC § 1546(b) (establishing criminal penalties for use of 
false documents to establish work authorization under § 1324a). 
 8 IRCA contained numerous other provisions as well, notably a one-time amnesty 
program that eventually resulted in allowing approximately three million people to ob-
tain lawful permanent residence. IRCA § 201, codified at 8 USC § 1255a. IRCA also made 
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It is time to consider whether, and if so to what extent, the 
employer sanctions regime has deterred illegal immigration and 
protected U.S. labor markets. This article argues that the prohi-
bition on employment has achieved neither of its purposes, and 
in fact has led to increased workplace exploitation of undocu-
mented immigrants, strengthened the “jobs magnet” that sanc-
tions aimed to weaken, encouraged illegal immigration, and 
eroded wages and working conditions for U.S. workers. Sanctions 
have also increased workplace discrimination and undermined 
public safety and homeland security by driving millions of un-
documented immigrants and their families into the shadows of 
civic life, fearful that cooperation with ordinary law enforcement, 
public health, and other social programs may lead to their depor-
tation.9 Furthermore, the prohibition on employment has oper-
ated to grant an unfair competitive advantage to outlaw firms 
that violate labor and immigration laws as against law-abiding 
firms that respect both. By delegating immigration enforcement 
powers to private employers, sanctions have created inherently 
exploitative conditions in the workplace. Employer sanctions 
have failed and should be abandoned. 
The historical genesis of employer sanctions is not in dis-
pute. In the 1980s, proponents of sanctions argued and some 
congressional and other research studies concluded,10 first, that 
the “jobs magnet” in the United States inexorably attracted un-
documented immigrants, who entered the country illegally or 
failed to depart upon the expiration of a visa, and second, that 
their presence had significant negative effects for domestic work-
ers, especially “low-income, low-skilled Americans, who are the 
most likely to face direct competition” from the undocumented.11 
IRCA sought to influence the incentives for employers inclined to 
hire undocumented immigrants by prohibiting and penalizing 
the practice, thereby diminishing the strength of the “jobs mag-
  
discrimination in the verification of immigration status an unlawful employment practice, 
8 USC § 1342b, expressly preempted state employer sanctions law, 8 USC § 1324a(h)(2), 
and directed labor enforcement funds to immigrant-intensive industries, IRCA § 111(d). 
See Richard E. Blum, Labor Standards Enforcement and the Results of Labor Migration: 
Protecting Undocumented Workers After Sure-Tan, The IRCA, and Patel, 63 NYU L Rev 
1342 (1988) (analyzing labor enforcement provisions of IRCA § 111(d)). 
 9 See President George W. Bush, New Temporary Worker Program: Remarks by the 
President on Immigration Policy (Jan 7, 2004), available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
news/releases/2004/01/ 20040107-3.html> (last visited May 20, 2007). See also Michael J. 
Wishnie, Immigrants and the Right to Petition, 78 NYU L Rev 667, 673–79 (2003). 
 10 See, for example, SCIRP Final Report at 11 (cited in note 4). 
 11 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1985, S Rep No 99-132, 99th Cong, 1st 
Sess 5 (1985). 
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net,” deterring unlawful immigration, and safeguarding wages 
and working conditions for U.S. workers. 
There was also a political rationale for employer sanctions. 
The provisions were part of a grand bargain and the principal 
quid pro quo for the one-time amnesty provision that was the 
other major element of IRCA.12 The AFL-CIO and NAACP sup-
ported employer sanctions, as did a variety of anti-immigrant 
and nativist organizations. Business groups, Latino organiza-
tions, and civil liberties groups, including the ACLU, U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce, and National Council of La Raza, op-
posed employer sanctions.13 But even opponents of employer 
sanctions recognized that the prohibition on employment might 
be a reasonable price to pay for the IRCA amnesty provision, 
which led to the eventual legalization of three million people. 
Many predicted that employer sanctions would burden business, 
encourage discrimination in hiring, fail adequately to protect 
U.S. workers, and do little to discourage illegal immigration. But 
all agreed that the nation’s immigration system was flawed and 
in need of reform, and IRCA promised both legalization and in-
creased enforcement—politically, something for all sides. 
Curiously, however, as Congress and the Administration 
struggled through complex and politically fraught negotiations in 
2006 to enact comprehensive immigration reform, all major 
voices assumed that Congress would and should continue em-
ployer sanctions.14 The same has been true thus far in 2007.15 
  
 12 See 8 USC § 1255a (2000). Although envisioned as a one-time measure in which 
persons present in the US since 1982 applied for amnesty within a one-year filing period, 
implementation of the amnesty prompted extensive litigation. See Courts Approve Set-
tlement Agreements in LULAC/Newman, CSS; Filing Instructions Expected at End of 
March, 81 No 9 Interp Rel 275 (Mar 1, 2004). 
 13 Peter Brownell, The Declining Enforcement of Employer Sanctions 1 (Migration 
Policy Institute (“MPI”) Sept 1, 2005) (noting AFL-CIO and NAACP support for sanctions 
as early as 1970s), available at <http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display 
.cfm?id=332> (last visited Feb 9, 2007). The U.S. Chamber of Commerce opposed sanc-
tions from the beginning as “unworkable and costly.” Nancy Humel Montwieler, The 
Immigration Reform Law of 1986: Analysis, Text, and Legislative History 6 (BNA 1987). 
Over time, the Chamber “relented from its hardline opposition,” and by 1985, eventually 
offered “qualified support” for the grand compromise in IRCA: legalization in exchange for 
sanctions. Id at 7, 10. 
 14 Notably, in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, President Bush announced that 
the Department of Homeland Security would temporarily suspend enforcement of em-
ployer sanctions in affected regions. Gregory Rodriguez, La Nueva Orleans: Latino immi-
grants, many of them here illegally, will rebuild the Gulf Coast—and stay there, Los Ange-
les Times M1 (Sept 25, 2005). 
 15 See, for instance, the lead House immigration reform bill, Security Through Regu-
larized Immigration and a Vibrant Economy Act of 2007, HR 1645 (2007) (“STRIVE Act”), 
Title III, Sec 301, and the lead Senate bill, The Border Security, Economic Opportunity, 
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This is particularly odd given that, in the years since 1986, some 
major proponents of employer sanctions, including the AFL-CIO 
and African-American civil rights organizations, have switched 
their view and now formally oppose sanctions16—even as the 
original critics of sanctions, such as the business community, 
remain opposed. Instead, the discussions are shaped by the na-
tional security needs of a post-September 11 world, concerns 
about economic competition in the 21st century, and the deter-
mination of both political parties to secure the mythical “Latino 
vote.” 
For example, in January 2004, President Bush offered a 
vague proposal for a mammoth new guest worker program;17 
since then, several major immigration reform measures have 
been introduced in Congress, sponsored by many of the most 
powerful legislators of each party, and in 2006 both the House 
and the Senate passed major immigration legislation.18 But de-
spite a consensus among business, labor, civil rights, Latino, and 
African American communities that employer sanctions should 
be abandoned,19 each one of the major proposals that preceded 
Senate and House action, as well as the bills passed by each 
chamber, assumes the continuation of employer sanctions, and 
most seek to make more efficient the present system of document 
verification.20 Even centrist immigration researchers and advo-
  
and Immigration Reform Act of 2007, S 1639 (2007), Title III, Sec 302. 
 16 AFL-CIO, Statement of the Executive Council (Feb 16, 2000), available at 
<http://www.aflcio.org/aboutus/thisistheaflcio/ecouncil/ec0216200b.cfm> (last visited Feb 
9, 2007); Brownell, Declining Enforcement at 6 (cited in note 13) (observing that NAACP 
reversed position in early 1990s to oppose sanctions). 
 17 See Bush, New Temporary Worker Program (cited in note 9). 
 18 Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005, HR 
4437, 109th Cong, 1st Sess (Dec 6, 2005); Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 
2006, S 2611, 109th Cong, 2d Sess (Apr 7, 2006). 
 19 See note 16 (citing AFL-CIO Executive Council statement), note 13 (citing US 
Chamber of Commerce statements). 
 20 See Secure America and Orderly Immigration Act, S 1033, 109th Cong, 1st Sess 
(May 12, 2005) (whose principal sponsors include Senators Ted Kennedy and John 
McCain); Secure America and Orderly Immigration Act, HR 2330, 109th Cong, 1st Sess 
(May 12, 2005); Comprehensive Enforcement and Immigration Reform Act of 2005, S 
1438, 109th Cong, 1st Sess (July 20, 2005) (sponsored by Republican Senators John 
Cornyn and Jon Kyl); REAL GUEST Act of 2005, HR 3333, 109th Cong, 1st Sess (July 19, 
2005) (sponsored by Representative Tom Tancredo); and Save America Comprehensive 
Immigration Act of 2005, HR 2092, 109th Cong, 1st Sess (May 4, 2005) (sponsored by 
Representative Jackson-Lee). See also Eliot Turner and Marc R. Rosenblum, Solving the 
Unauthorized Migrant Problem: Proposed Legislation in the US 2–3 (MPI Sept 1, 2005) 
(noting that all major legislation introduced in response to the President’s proposal for 
new guestworker program includes “new ways to penalize such employers”), available at 
<http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=333> (last visited Feb 9, 
2007). 
 7/22/2007 11:59:13 PM 
198 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2007: 
cates presume that any liberalization of the current immigration 
regime will depend on another political trade for increased pen-
alties and enforcement, including expanded employer sanctions 
provisions.21 
I. THE ORIGINS OF IRCA 
During the first century of federal immigration regulation 
there was no prohibition on the employment of unauthorized 
immigrants, and as the Supreme Court observed, employment of 
immigrants was “at best” a “peripheral concern” of the INA.22 
Nevertheless, labor market considerations frequently influenced 
immigration rules, at times favoring liberalization (as in the 
massive braceros programs of the 1940s–60s) and in other peri-
ods constriction (as in the anti-Asian laws of the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries).23 One prominent immigration historian 
concluded, “[i]t would be in fact difficult to determine where im-
migration policy ends and labor policy begins, the two are so 
closely interrelated.”24 
Indeed, Congress was careful to protect employers of un-
documented immigrants from criminal sanction. Pursuant to the 
“Texas proviso,” Congress specifically exempted such employers 
from the federal criminal penalties for “harboring” aliens when 
these penalties were enacted in 1952.25 To be sure, undocu-
mented immigrants could be arrested in the workplace and de-
  
 21 See Spencer Abraham, et al, Immigration and America’s Future: A New Chapter: 
Report of the Independent Task Force on Immigration and America’s Future 45 (MPI Sept 
2006) (“MPI Task Force”) (“Recommendation #3: The Task Force recommends that man-
datory employer verification and workplace enforcement be at the center of more effective 
immigration enforcement reforms.”). The MPI Task Force was co-chaired by former Re-
publican Senator and Bush cabinet member Spence Abraham and former Democratic 
Representative and 9-11 Commission co-chair Lee Hamilton. Its members included the 
leaders of immigration reform in both parties, such as Senators Edward Kennedy and 
John McCain, and its report is likely to prove influential in the continuing debate. See, 
for example, Editorial, Looking Over the Wall, NY Times A16 (Oct 9, 2006) (lauding rec-
ommendations of MPI Task Force). 
 22 De Canas v Bica, 424 US 351, 360 (1976). 
 23 See Grounds for Exclusion of Aliens under the Immigration and Nationality Act: 
Historical Background and Analysis, 100th Cong, 2d Sess 8 (1988) (“The Chinese Exclu-
sion Act . . . was enacted out of a concern for protecting domestic labor from foreign com-
petition, combined with racial prejudice.”). 
 24 E.P. Hutchinson, Legislative History of American Immigration Policy 1789–1965 
492 (Penn 1981). See also id at 502 (“Congress in designing immigration legislation has 
been responsive to considerations of the labor supply and the labor market.”). 
 25 Harboring was criminalized in 1952, but employment was exempted from the 
start. 8 USC § 1324(a) (1952) (“Provided, however, That for the purposes of this section, 
employment (including the usual and normal practices incident to employment) shall not 
be deemed to constitute harboring.”). 
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ported,26 as they could be arrested anywhere, but such workers 
faced no additional immigration or other penalties because of 
their employment. Nor was the employer acting unlawfully 
merely by employing such workers. Further, labor and employ-
ment laws generally applied to all covered firms and workers, 
without regard to the immigration status of employees,27 with 
the principal exception that deported workers could not pursue 
certain remedies.28 
The earliest legislative proposals for federal penalties on 
employers who hire undocumented immigrants date to the 
1950s,29 but the first serious bill to accomplish this goal was in-
troduced by Representative Peter Rodino in 1973, at the instiga-
tion of the AFL-CIO and NAACP.30 The Rodino bill twice passed 
the House in the early 1970s and won some support from the 
Nixon and Ford Administrations, but it died in the Senate each 
time.31 A 1977 Carter Administration bill containing a sanctions 
provision directed at a “pattern or practice” of hiring undocu-
mented workers, as well as legalization measures, also went no-
where.32 These proposals faced substantial and “spirited” opposi-
  
 26 See, for example, INS v Lopez-Mendoza, 468 US 1032 (1984) (rejecting challenge to 
INS worksite raid resulting in arrest and deportation of workers). 
 27 See, for example, NLRB v Apollo Tire Co, Inc, 604 F2d 1180, 1884 (9th Cir 1979) 
(Kennedy concurring) (arguing that “if the NLRA were inapplicable to workers who are 
illegal aliens, we would leave helpless the very persons who most need protection from 
exploitative employer practices”). 
 28 See Sure-Tan, Inc v NLRB, 467 US 883, 883 (1984) (noting that deported workers 
are ineligible for back pay or reinstatement under the National Labor Relations Act). 
 29 See Betsy Cooper and Kevin O’Neil, Lessons from the Immigration Reform and 
Control Act of 1986, MPI Policy Brief No 3 (Aug 2005) (noting proposals by Senator Doug-
las in 1950s), available at <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/PolicyBrief_No3_Aug 
05.pdf> (last visited Feb 9, 2007); Michael Fix and Paul T. Hill, Enforcing Employer Sanc-
tions: Challenges and Strategies 22 (RAND Corp/Urban Inst 1991) (same). The first for-
mal proposal for sanctions may have been from the Truman Commission on Migratory 
Labor, which in 1951 recommended adopting sanctions to deter Mexican migration. De-
metrios A. Papademetriou and B. Lindsay Lowell, Employer Sanctions: Expectations and 
Early Outcomes, in Michael Fix, ed, The Paper Curtain: Employer Sanctions’ Implementa-
tion, Impact, and Reform 215, 216 (RAND Corp/Urban Inst 1991). On occasion, Congress 
had responded to concerns about exploitation of immigrant workers, see, for example, 
Padrone Act, Act of June 23, 1874, 18 Stat 251 (criminalizing trafficking and exploitation 
of Italian children); United States v Kozminski, 487 US 931, 947 (1988) (“Congress en-
acted the Padrone statute in 1874 ‘to prevent [this] practice of enslaving, buying, selling, 
or using Italian children’”), but never by prohibiting the hire of undocumented immi-
grants. 
 30 Brownell, Declining Enforcement at 1 (cited in note 13). 
 31 SCIRP Final Report, The Immigration Reform Law of 1986 at 4 (cited in note 13); 
Papademetriou and Lowell, Employer Sanctions at 216–17 & n 3 (cited in note 29) (listing 
Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan Administration recommendations to adopt sanctions). 
 32 Montwieler, The Immigration Reform Law of 1986 at 4 (cited in note 13); SCIRP 
Final Report at 62 (cited in note 4). In 1974, Congress amended the Farm Labor Contrac-
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tion, however, particularly from business groups and Latino or-
ganizations.33 
A desire to reform immigration policies persisted in some 
quarters, and in 1978 Congress established the Select Commis-
sion on Immigration and Refugee Policy (“SCIRP”). The Select 
Commission held public hearings around the country, commis-
sioned numerous papers from social scientists, historians, and 
other scholars, reviewed mountains of data, and after extensive 
study issued its final report (complete with seven volumes of ap-
pendices) in 1981. As the final report explained: “In the hearings 
the Select Commission has held and in the letters it has received, 
one issue has emerged as most pressing—the problem of un-
documented/illegal migration.”34 
The notion of prohibiting employers from hiring undocu-
mented immigrants was controversial. The AFL-CIO endorsed 
sanctions in a 1980 Executive Council statement, and labor lead-
ers testified at SCIRP hearings in support of the measure, as did 
the American Legion, the National Urban League, and environ-
mental groups.35 Many business groups declined to offer public 
testimony, but as the SCIRP staff noted, “[t]heir previous opposi-
tion to employer sanctions is well known, and it is likely that 
they will continue to espouse their old position.”36 Those business 
groups that did testify emphasized the regulatory burdens of 
sanctions and the unfairness of deputizing the private sector to 
enforce public immigration laws.37 Latino organizations, civil 
rights groups, and the U.S. Catholic Conference of Bishops also 
testified in opposition, emphasizing that sanctions would encour-
age employment discrimination by employers.38 
Despite the lack of public consensus, in 1981 the Select 
Commission proposed a host of detailed legislative reforms. At 
their core lay the suggestion of a grand bargain—legalization in 
exchange for employer sanctions and increased border enforce-
ment—that formed the foundation for what became IRCA.39 No-
  
tor Act of 1963 to prohibit the knowing employment of unauthorized workers. SCIRP 
Final Report at 61 n *. See Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act Amendments of 1974, 
Pub L No 93-518, 88 Stat 1652. 
 33 Papademetriou and Lowell, Employer Sanctions at 217 (cited in note 29). 
 34 SCIRP Final Report at 35 (cited in note 4). 
 35 SCIRP Staff Report at App H 250–53 (cited in note 2) (summarizing AFL state-
ment and testimony). 
 36 Id at 251. 
 37 Id at 251–52. 
 38 Id at 249, 253–54. 
 39 SCIRP Final Report at xvi–xvii, xxvi–xxvii, 46–56, 59–71 (cited in note 4). The 
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tably, all eight members of Congress who served on the Select 
Commission voted to recommend adoption of employer sanc-
tions.40 SCIRP’s rationale for sanctions was straightforward. 
Enormous wage disparities between the United States and many 
other nations attract undocumented immigrants to the U.S. labor 
market, and these disparities cannot likely be overcome by in-
tensified U.S. penalties. Border and interior enforcement are in-
adequate to deter new illegal immigration or to locate and arrest 
persons already present in the United States. Employer incen-
tives can be adjusted, however, through the imposition of penal-
ties for hiring undocumented workers, especially when combined 
with enhanced labor standards enforcement. If fewer employers 
are willing to hire undocumented workers, Congress will achieve 
its twin goals of deterring illegal immigration and protecting 
U.S. workers.41 
Following completion of its report, Senator Alan Simpson 
and Representative Romano Mazzoli held several days of hear-
ings on the Select Commission’s recommendations, and the next 
month, the Reagan Administration endorsed a similar package of 
reforms: increased border and interior enforcement, employer 
sanctions, and legalization, plus a temporary guestworker pro-
gram.42 In 1982, Simpson and Mazzoli introduced legislation to 
codify this compromise package, and they continued to introduce 
the legislation annually until IRCA was passed in 1986. 
The Simpson-Mazzoli legislation initially drew criticism 
from all directions. Business groups opposed sanctions as bur-
densome and inefficient, civil rights and Latino groups opposed 
sanctions as likely to spur employment discrimination, and 
Western agricultural interests and organized labor weighed in 
with various objections. Indeed, agribusiness interests were 
“frank about their dependence on undocumented labor and the 
severe financial problems that sanctions would impose.”43   
Commission debated proposals for a new guestworker program as well, noting the experi-
ence of European countries and that of the U.S. during the notorious braceros program. In 
the end, the Commission did not recommend a large-scale temporary worker program, 
although it did suggest some reforms to the visa program for farmworkers. Id at 45. The 
possibility of a special farmworker category, insisted upon by Western growers, would tie 
up Congress in its effort to enact broad reforms until a last-minute compromise in 1986. 
 40 SCIRP Staff Report at 566 (cited in note 2). 
 41 SCIRP Final Report at 59–71 (cited in note 4). See also SCIRP Staff Report at 559–
71 (cited in note 2). The Select Commission specifically rejected a proposal to increase 
penalties on undocumented workers beyond deportation itself. SCIRP Final Report at 66 
(cited in note 4). 
 42 Montwieler, The Immigration Reform Law of 1986 at 5 (cited in note 13). 
 43 Fix and Hill, Enforcing Employer Sanctions at 28 (cited in note 29). Agribusiness 
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Proponents of sanctions responded with various arguments. 
Labor unions and the NAACP insisted that protection of U.S. 
workers, especially low-wage and African-American workers, 
demanded that employers be prohibited from hiring undocu-
mented immigrants. Some “law-and-order” partisans emphasized 
the implications for the nation’s sovereignty of its failure to con-
trol the borders,44 while other sanctions supporters lamented the 
impact on natural resources and worried about the fiscal conse-
quences for welfare programs, public education, and other gov-
ernment services of continued large-scale migration.45 Some 
warned, darkly, of the social and cultural implications of Latin 
American migration, legal and illegal.46 
In fall 1986, tortuous and prolonged congressional negotia-
tions finally yielded a deal on an expanded agricultural guest-
worker program. Both the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the 
AFL-CIO had come to support the overall package, including the 
employer sanctions provisions that business interests had previ-
ously opposed,47 notwithstanding continuing business objections 
to a regulatory policy that deputized the private sector to enforce 
public immigration laws.48 
A conference bill containing the principal elements of the 
blueprint set forth in the SCIRP Report emerged from commit-
tee, and passage was secured.49 Major stakeholders were re-
signed to the compromise legislation that was, on the whole, 
likely to favor their interests.50 “It isn’t the Sistine Chapel, but 
  
remains candid about its dependency on immigrant labor to this day. See Inmates Will 
Replace Wary Migrants in Colorado Fields, NY Times A25 (Mar 4, 2007) (reporting that 
Colorado has expanded its prison labor program to replace immigrant agricultural work-
ers deterred from working in state by new state penalties). 
 44 See, for example, Fix and Hill, Enforcing Employer Sanctions at 22–23 (cited in 
note 29) (quoting Attorney General Edwin Meese’s statement that “We cannot fairly 
speak of ourselves as a sovereign nation if we cannot responsibly decide who may cross 
our borders”). 
 45 Id at 26–27. 
 46 Id at 25–26. 
 47 Montwieler, The Immigration Reform Law of 1986 at 10 (cited in note 13). 
 48 See, for example, Editorial, The Immigration Nightmare, Wall St J 22 (Nov 10, 
1986) (criticizing IRCA, especially sanctions provisions); William H. Miller, Alive and 
kicking; immigration bill gains, could still pass in ‘86, Industry Week (July 21, 1986) 
(noting “heavy opposition by business lobbyists” to employer sanctions); Annelise Ander-
son, Employer Sanctions Don’t Work Elsewhere, Wall St J 1 (Sept 9, 1986) (“the employer-
sanctions approach is fundamentally flawed”). 
 49 Montwieler, The Immigration Reform Law of 1986 at 14–18 (cited in note 13). 
 50 Id at 6–14. 
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it’s not a bad paint job,” commented Representative Dan Lun-
gren, one of the many central players in IRCA’s passage.51 
Congress, like SCIRP before it, described the primary pur-
poses of IRCA as discouraging illegal immigration and protecting 
U.S. workers from wage competition with undocumented work-
ers. Employer sanctions and legalization were the means to 
achieve these goals, frequently termed the “keystone” of IRCA. 
The principal means of . . . curtailing future illegal immi-
gration[] is through employer sanctions . . . . Employers 
will be deterred by the penalties in this legislation from 
hiring unauthorized aliens and this, in turn, will deter 
aliens from entering illegally or violating their status in 
search of employment.52 
Supporters of sanctions intended that over time IRCA would 
establish a new employment standard, one that would become a 
familiar, widely-accepted principle of the workplace, akin to 
minimum-wage laws and Title VII’s anti-discrimination rules.53 
Consistent with the focus on altering employer incentives to 
hire and exploit immigrant workers, Congress also directed the 
U.S. Department of Labor to target its wage-and-hour enforce-
ment activities so as to “deter the employment of unauthorized 
aliens and remove the economic incentive for employers to ex-
ploit and use such aliens.”54 Senator Simpson himself empha-
sized the importance of labor enforcement in achieving immigra-
tion goals: “We are all aware that the answer to illegal immigra-
tion rests with increased border enforcement, and increased la-
bor law enforcement.”55 Senator Ted Kennedy made the same 
point in his supplemental statement in the SCIRP report.56 
  
 51 Id at 17. 
 52 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, HR Rep No 99-682(I), 99th Cong, 2d 
Sess 46 (1986), reprinted in 1986 USCCAN 5649, 5650. See, for example, S Rep No 99-
132 at 1 (cited in note 11) (“The primary incentive for illegal immigration is the availabil-
ity of U.S. employment.”). 
 53 Robert Bach and Doris Meissner, Employment and Immigration Reform: Employer 
Sanctions Four Years Later, in Fix, ed, The Paper Curtain 281, 284–85 (cited in note 29). 
 54 IRCA § 111(d). See also SCIRP Final Report at 70 (cited in note 4) (“[T]he Select 
Commission urges the increased enforcement of existing wage and working standards 
legislation.”); SCIRP Staff Report at App H 261 (cited in note 2) (noting that in SCIRP 
public hearings, “[t]here was no disagreement on the proposal to more vigorously enforce 
wage and working standards legislation”). 
 55 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1985, Hearings on S 1200 before the Sub-
committee on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 
99th Cong, 1st Sess 27 (1985). 
 56 SCIRP Final Report at 357 (cited in note 4) (“We must . . . intensify the enforce-
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Congress also took pains to ensure that courts and executive 
branch agencies would not construe IRCA as excluding immi-
grants from mainstream labor protections, for the obvious reason 
that any such exclusion would increase employer incentives to 
prefer undocumented workers and therefore undermine IRCA’s 
purposes. Thus, the House Judiciary Committee report accompa-
nying IRCA stated: 
It is not the intention of the Committee that the employer 
sanctions provisions of the bill be used to undermine or 
diminish in any way labor protections in existing law, or 
to limit the powers of federal or state labor relations 
boards, labor standards agencies, or labor arbitrators to 
remedy unfair practices committed against undocumented 
employees.57 
Likewise, the House Education and Labor Committee re-
ported that to reduce labor protections for undocumented immi-
grants would “be counter-productive of [the] intent to limit the 
hiring of undocumented employees and the depressing effect on 
working conditions caused by their employment.”58 
In short, IRCA’s enactment followed years of bipartisan dis-
cussion, study, and debate and adhered remarkably closely to the 
core structure outlined by the Select Commission. The choice to 
use employer sanctions to alter employer hiring incentives, di-
minishing demand for undocumented workers and thereby deter-
ring illegal immigration, was deliberate and explicit. Guided by 
the SCIRP recommendations, Congress chose not to penalize 
workers for accepting employment without authorization but 
instead to increase labor standards enforcement as a necessary 
feature of the broad effort to discourage employers from hiring 
unauthorized immigrants. Maintenance of all existing labor pro-
tections for undocumented immigrants furthered the goal of dis-
couraging their employment. 
At the time of IRCA’s enactment, best estimates placed the 
undocumented population at approximately 4 million people.59 
  
ment of existing [labor] laws . . . . Vigorous and effective enforcement of these laws will 
reduce the incentive for employers to hire undocumented workers.”). Senator Kennedy 
introduced the amendment that became IRCA § 111(d). Immigration Reform and Control, 
S Rep No 98-62, 98th Cong, 1st Sess 29 (1983). 
 57 HR Rep No 99-682(I) at 58 (cited in note 52). 
 58 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, HR Rep No 99-682(II), 99th Cong, 2d 
Sess 9 (1986), reprinted in 1986 USCCAN 5757, 5758. 
 59 Jeffrey S. Passell, Unauthorized Migrants: Numbers and Characteristics 10 (Pew 
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II. THE CONSEQUENCES OF IRCA 
In evaluating the results of employer sanctions, several as-
pects of twenty years’ experience with IRCA stand out. First, af-
ter an initial dip caused by IRCA’s legalization program, the un-
documented population in this country has grown tremendously. 
Second, employer sanctions have caused substantial employment 
discrimination. Third, despite contrary legislative intent, courts 
have interpreted the employer sanctions provisions as excluding 
undocumented workers from the mainstream of federal and state 
labor and employment protections. These judicial interpretations 
have functioned to exempt employers who hire undocumented 
immigrants from ordinary liability for the violation of basic 
workplace rights. This functional immunity, in turn, has under-
mined the deterrent effects of sanctions on the hiring of undocu-
mented employees. Fourth, although the numbers have varied 
somewhat over two decades, overall, INS and then ICE have de-
prioritized enforcing employer sanctions relative to other immi-
gration enforcement responsibilities. Fifth, major proponents of 
employer sanctions from the 1970s and 1980s have changed posi-
tions, such that the AFL-CIO, business interests, civil rights 
groups, and Latino and African-American organizations now 
concur that sanctions have failed and should be abandoned. Fi-
nally, and most perniciously, the sanctions regime has granted to 
employers an enormous, coercive power over their non-citizen 
workers and over low-wage U.S. workers who compete with 
them. Nothing in this record indicates that the prohibition on 
employment of unauthorized immigrants has succeeded nor that 
it should be continued and intensified. 
A. Growth in Undocumented Population 
In the first few years after IRCA’s enactment, most esti-
mates held that the total undocumented population in the U.S. 
  
Hispanic Trust June 14, 2005), available at <http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php? 
ReportID=46> (last visited Feb 9, 2007). Government estimates put the undocumented 
population at between 3.5 and 6 million in 1986. SCIRP Final Report at 36 (cited in note 
4). Demographers estimated that approximately seven-hundred thousand new undocu-
mented immigrants entered the U.S. or overstayed their visas each year (averaged be-
tween 2000 and March 2004), Passell, Unauthorized Migrants at 5 (cited in this note), 
while U.S. government estimates throughout the late 1980s and 1990s put the net annual 
increase in the undocumented population at nearly three-hundred thousand. See, for 
instance, 2000 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, at 
271–72, available at <http://www.dhs.gov/ximgtn/statistics/publications/archive.shtm> 
(last visited May 30, 2007). 
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declined. This decline was principally due not to fewer illegal 
entries, but to the legalization of approximately three million 
persons.60 
Today there are approximately twelve million undocumented 
immigrants in the United States,61 with a net annual increase in 
the 1990s of approximately five-hundred thousand persons.62 
This is a dramatic increase from the estimated four million un-
documented persons present in the U.S. when IRCA was en-
acted. When one considers that nearly 3 million persons regular-
ized their status pursuant to IRCA’s legalization program, the 
two-decade increase becomes even more startling. Many factors 
have influenced the growth in the undocumented population, of 
course, and no reliable regression analysis exists to determine 
the precise causal role of any one factor, but at first glance, these 
figures do not suggest IRCA has been a success.63 
The overwhelming majority of the undocumented are from 
Latin America (78 percent), and more than half are from Mexico 
alone (56 percent).64 Perhaps 25 to 40 percent have overstayed a 
visa; the balance crossed the border unlawfully.65 Of the nearly 
12 million undocumented persons, 1.8 million are children.66 
Most undocumented immigrants live in families.67 Their labor 
  
 60 Papademetriou and Lowell, Employer Sanctions at 225 (cited in note 29) (summa-
rizing data regarding border apprehensions, and household surveys in sending communi-
ties, and concluding “to date, there has been relatively little reduction in illegal entries”); 
id at 226 (concluding data indicated that by 1988, number of visa overstayers “had basi-
cally returned to pre-IRCA levels”). 
 61 Jeffrey S. Passell, The Size and Characteristics of the Unauthorized Migrant Popu-
lation in the U.S. 1 (Pew Hispanic Center Mar 7, 2006) (estimating unauthorized popula-
tion at 11.5–12 million in March 2006), available at <http://pewhispanic.org/reports/ 
report.php?ReportID=61> (last visited Feb 9, 2007); Abraham, et al, MPI Task Force at 
19–20 (cited in note 21). 
 62 Passell, Unauthorized Migrants at 1, 10 (cited in note 59). In the decade 1995–
2004, between seven hundred and seven hundred and fifty thousand persons entered the 
U.S. unlawfully or overstayed a visa each year, id at 6, but approximately two hundred 
thousand died, departed, or regularized their status each year, yielding a net increase in 
the undocumented population of approximately one-half million persons annually. Jenni-
fer Van Hook, Frank D. Bean, and Jeffrey Passel, Unauthorized Migrants Living in the 
United States: A Mid-Decade Portrait 2 (MPI 2005), available at <http://www.migration 
information.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=329> (last visited Feb 9, 2007). 
 63 In addition to IRCA’s influence, if any, those factors surely include harsh amend-
ments to the immigration laws in 1990 and 1996 that narrowed the opportunities for 
many unauthorized immigrants to regularize their status, shifting global economic condi-
tions, and substantial backlogs in processing family- and employment-based visas and 
naturalization applications. 
 64 Passell, Size and Characteristics at 4 (cited in note 61). 
 65 Id at 9. 
 66 Id at 7–8. 
 67 Id at 18. 
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force participation rates, particularly for men, are high, although 
concentrated in low-wage, low-skilled positions.68 
B. Increased Employment Discrimination 
In 1990, a Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) study 
concluded that employer sanctions had prompted significant dis-
crimination in employment, as Latino and immigrant rights crit-
ics had warned.69 In particular, in a national survey of 4.6 mil-
lion employers, GAO determined that a startling 19 percent had 
engaged in discriminatory behavior. The employer discrimina-
tion included not “hir[ing] job applicants whose foreign appear-
ance or accent led [employers] to suspect that they might be un-
authorized aliens,” “appl[ying] IRCA’s verification system only to 
persons who had a ‘foreign’ appearance or accent,” or “hiring only 
persons born in the United States or not hiring persons with 
temporary work eligibility documents.”70 
GAO attributed this widespread discrimination not to em-
ployer bias or anti-immigrant animus, however, but primarily to 
“employers’ lack of understanding of requirements, employers’ 
confusion about eligibility determinations, and the prevalence of 
fraudulent documents.”71 The Comptroller General summarized 
these findings to Congress: “GAO also found that there was 
widespread discrimination. But was there discrimination as a 
result of IRCA? That is the key question Congress directed GAO 
to answer. GAO’s answer is yes.”72 
In addition to its findings of widespread employment dis-
crimination, the GAO suggested that sanctions appeared to have 
reduced illegal immigration for the reasons intended by Con-
gress: employment of undocumented workers had declined and 
fewer persons were therefore making the dangerous border cross-
ing.73 The GAO did not undertake an extensive analysis of this 
key question, devoting three pages of its lengthy report to sum-
marize research done primarily by other entities, including a re-
port by the Urban Institute and preliminary findings by the 
  
 68 Passell, Size and Characteristics at 25-30 (cited in note 61). 
 69 United States General Accounting Office, Immigration Reform: Employer Sanc-
tions and the Question of Discrimination, GAO/GGD-90-62 (GAO 1990), available at 
<http://www.gao.gov/docdblite/summary.php?rptno=GGD-90-62> (last visited Feb 9, 
2007). 
 70 Id at 5–7. 
 71 Id at 3. 
 72 Id. 
 73 GAO, Immigration Reform at 103–06 (cited in note 69). 
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RAND Corporation. GAO itself reported on a small survey of 
immigrants arrested in worksite enforcement operations,74 but 
several of the other studies noted by GAO failed to show that 
IRCA had reduced illegal immigration.75 
C. IRCA Proponents Now Oppose Sanctions 
One important consequence of the 1990 GAO study was to 
prompt the NAACP to reverse course, abandoning its prior sup-
port for sanctions and instead declaring its opposition to the ap-
proach.76 A decade later, the AFL-CIO also switched positions 
and declared its formal and public opposition to sanctions.77 The 
labor movement’s change was a product not only of the evidence 
that sanctions caused employment discrimination, but also of an 
internal struggle among unions embracing traditional protection-
ist impulses, “perhaps reflecting a residual nativism,” and other 
unions that had successfully organized immigrant-intensive in-
dustries where employers used the sanctions provisions to retali-
ate against organizing employees.78 
Although business groups did moderate their long-standing 
opposition to sanctions in the run-up to IRCA’s adoption, they 
have not generally embraced sanctions. Many employers found 
the paperwork requirements less onerous than feared, and in the 
absence of vigorous enforcement by INS, business was not “in the 
forefront of repeal efforts” in the late 1980s and early 1990s.79 
Nevertheless, business remains opposed on principle to sanctions 
as unnecessary regulation of the private workplace and as an 
  
 74 This survey found that 16 percent of arrested workers reported having been re-
fused a job because of IRCA’s document verification requirements. Id at 104. 
 75 Id at 105–06 (noting RAND found initial reduction in illegal immigration but ob-
served that long-term effects were unclear; Current Population Survey of US Census 
Bureau concluded it was “not possible to make a determination” whether IRCA had af-
fected illegal immigration; and a University of Chicago study found “no evidence” that 
IRCA had reduced illegal immigration). 
 76 Brownell, Declining Enforcement at 6 (cited in note 13). 
 77 See AFL-CIO, Statement of the Executive Council (cited in note 16). For a recent 
affirmation of this position, see, for example, Letter to Senator Kennedy from SEIU 
Leaders (Jan 16, 2007) (“We must replace the current regime of employer sanctions with 
vigorous labor and civil rights law enforcement.”), available at <http://www.seiu.org/ 
media/pressreleases.cfm?pr_id=1366> (last visited May 30, 2007). 
 78 Catherine Fisk and Michael Wishnie, The Story of Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 
Inc. v. NLRB: Labor Rights without Remedies for Undocumented Immigrants, in Laura 
Cooper and Catherine Fisk, eds, Labor Law Stories 401 (Foundation Press 2005), avail-
able at <http://eprints.law.duke.edu/archive/ 00001243/> (last visited Feb 9, 2007). 
 79 Bach and Meissner, Employment and Immigration Reform at 289 (cited in note 
53). 
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unfair deputization of the private sector to conduct public law 
enforcement.80 
D. Low Government Enforcement 
Another important trend of the 1990s was a significant de-
cline in government enforcement of employer sanctions. Em-
ployer audits (inspection by INS or, now, ICE, of employer I-9 
forms) have declined 77 percent since 1990, from nearly 10,000 to 
fewer than 2,200 in 2003.81 Warnings to employers found after 
audit to have violated I-9 verification or record-keeping require-
ments have declined 62 percent in the same period, from nearly 
1,300 in 1990 to fewer than 500 in 2003.82 Final orders in fine 
proceedings against employers have declined 82 percent, from 
nearly 1,000 in 1990 to 124 in 2003.83 The number of fines is cer-
tain to fall further still, as the government issued a total of only 
three “notices of intent to fine”—the document that commences a 
fine proceeding against an employer—in all of 2004.84 Finally, 
with fewer resources devoted to investigating and prosecuting 
employers who violate IRCA, immigration authorities have made 
fewer worksite enforcement arrests of undocumented immi-
grants.85 Even with a recent spike in worksite enforcement, at a 
time when the Bush Administration appears intent on demon-
strating its commitment to immigration enforcement generally, 
these figures are unlikely to change dramatically in 2006 or 
2007. 
There are several reasons for the decline in government en-
forcement of employer sanctions. First, agency enforcement pri-
orities have shifted over time.86 By the mid-1980s, INS had be-
gun to focus enforcement resources on deportation of persons 
with criminal convictions, a trend which has continued to this 
  
 80 Id. 
 81 Brownell, Declining Enforcement at 3 fig 1 (cited in note 13). 
 82 Id at 3–4 fig 2. 
 83 Id at 4–5 fig 3. Fines collected have also decreased at a similar rate. Id at fig 4. 
Years refer to fiscal years, not calendar years. 
 84 United States General Accountability Office, Immigration Enforcement: Prelimi-
nary Observations on Employment Verification and Worksite Enforcement, GAO-05-822T 
at 14 & fig 3 (GAO 2005), available at <http://www.gao.gov/docdblite/summary.php 
?rptno=GAO-05-822T> (last visited Feb 9, 2007). 
 85 In 2003, ICE worksite enforcement arrests totaled only 445 for the entire nation, 
down 84 percent from 1999. Id at 15 & fig 4. 
 86 Id at 12 (“Worksite enforcement was a low priority for INS and continues to be a 
low priority for ICE.”). 
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day.87 In 1994, INS launched a major enforcement operation 
along the southwest border, known as “Operation Gatekeeper,” 
and redeployed agents from sanctions enforcement to this mis-
sion.88 In 1999, INS announced new interior enforcement priori-
ties which emphasized anti-smuggling and criminal investiga-
tions and downplayed worksite operations.89 After the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, worksite enforcement stopped almost 
completely, with the exception of targeted investigations of secu-
rity-related locations such as airports and nuclear reactors.90 
Second, employer sanctions target employers, not undocu-
mented immigrants, by obligating employers to verify status and 
to refuse to hire unauthorized workers. Federal immigration au-
thorities have traditionally targeted non-citizens, however, and 
this reorientation may not be fully embraced within the immi-
gration agency, which frequently “negotiate[s] down” fine 
amounts recommended by agents in subsequent discussions with 
employers or their counsel.91 Moreover, politicians of both parties 
regularly intervene when INS worksite enforcement disrupts 
important local industries.92 
Finally, amendments since 1986 have strengthened em-
ployer defenses, making it more difficult for the government to 
prove a substantive violation of the “knowing employment” re-
quirements, and no doubt discouraging some prosecutions. The 
ready availability of false documents has “also made it difficult 
  
 87 See Jason Juffras, IRCA and the Enforcement Mission of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, in Fix, ed, The Paper Curtain 33, 47–50 (cited in note 29) (describ-
ing GAO studies in the 1980s in addition to public concern about drug offenses and other 
crime contributing to congressional efforts to direct INS enforcement towards “criminal 
alien” problems). 
 88 Brownell, Declining Enforcement at 6 (cited in note 13). 
 89 INS, Interior Enforcement Strategy, (INS 1999), available at <http://www.vkblaw 
.com/news/ fiftyfour.htm> (last visited May 30, 2007). 
 90 GAO, Immigration Enforcement at 18 (cited in note 84) (“In keeping with the pri-
mary mission of DHS to combat terrorism, after September 11, 2001, INS and then ICE 
has focused its resources for worksite enforcement on identifying and removing unauthor-
ized workers from critical infrastructure sites.”); Brownell, Declining Enforcement at 6 
(cited in note 13). 
 91 GAO, Immigration Enforcement at 17 (cited in note 84). 
 92 David Bacon, And the Winner Is . . . : Immigration Reform on the killing floor, 
American Prospect A12-14 (Oct 23, 2005), available at <http://www.prospect.org/cs/ 
articles?article=and_the_winner _is_> (last visited August 6, 2007) (Nebraska meatpack-
ing industry); David Bacon, Immigration Law – Bringing Back Sweatshop Conditions 
(Oct 11, 1998), available at <http://dbacon.igc.org/Imgrants/ 11sanctn.html> (last visited 
August 6, 2007) (Georgia onion industry). 
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for ICE agents to prove that employers knowingly hired unau-
thorized workers.”93 
E. Erosion of Labor Rights for the Undocumented 
One of the most direct and corrosive effects of employer 
sanctions has been the undermining of labor and employment 
rights for undocumented immigrants who, notwithstanding 
IRCA’s prohibition, find work in this country. Before IRCA, 
courts and executive-branch agencies generally enforced labor 
and employment laws without regard for the immigration status 
of the employee.94 This practice was sensible, as few federal or 
state workplace statutes included immigration status among 
their exemptions from coverage, and employment of undocu-
mented immigrants was not unlawful in any event. The Supreme 
Court did carve out an exception for workers who were deported 
to another country, holding that such workers were ineligible for 
certain remedies under the National Labor Relations Act 
(“NLRA”),95 but this exception affected relatively few workers. 
Even after IRCA’s enactment, most courts and agencies contin-
ued to enforce federal and state labor laws on behalf of all work-
ers regardless of immigration status, including seeking all reme-
dies but reinstatement, given that IRCA had prohibited the 
knowing employment of unauthorized workers.96 Employers 
regularly argued that IRCA now exempted them from ordinary 
labor and employment liability, but courts and agencies rarely 
agreed. 
  
 93 GAO, Immigration Enforcement at 16 (cited in note 84). See also United States 
General Accounting Office, Illegal Aliens: Significant Obstacles to Reducing Unauthorized 
Alien Employment Exist, GAO/GGD-99-33 at 2 (1999) (observing prevalence of false 
documents impairs INS capacity to prove employer knowingly hired undocumented work-
ers), available at <http://www.gao.gov/docdblite/summary.php?rptno=GGD-99-33> (last 
visited Feb 9, 2007). 
 94 See, for example, Donovan v Burgett Greenhouses, Inc, 759 F2d 1483, 1485 (10th 
Cir 1985) (enforcing Fair Labor Standards Act against employer of undocumented work-
ers); NLRB v Apollo Tire Co, 604 F2d 1180 (9th Cir 1979) (undocumented worker covered 
by NLRA); Nizamuddowlah v Bengal Cabaret, Inc, 415 NYS2d 685, 685–86 (App Div 
1979) (undocumented worker covered by state minimum wage and overtime law). 
 95 Sure-Tan, Inc v NLRB, 467 US 883 (1984). See also Michael J. Wishnie, Emerging 
Issues for Undocumented Immigrants, 6 U Pa J Lab & Emp L 497 (2004). 
 96 See, for example, NLRB v APRA Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc, 134 F3d 50 (2d Cir 
1997) (after IRCA, NLRA still allows back pay award to undocumented worker); Patel v 
Quality Inn, 846 F2d 700, 704 (11th Cir 1988) (same, as to FLSA); EEOC v Switching Sys 
Div of Rockwell Int’l Corp, 783 F Supp 369, 374 (N D Ill 1992) (same, as to Title VII); 
Dowling v Slotnik, 712 A2d 396, 405 (Conn 1998) (same, as to workers’ compensation). 
Consider Wishnie, Emerging Issues for Undocumented Immigrants at 499–508 (cited in 
note 95). 
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The legal landscape changed radically when the Supreme 
Court decided Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc v NLRB.97 There 
the Court held that an employee who tendered false documents 
to his employer upon hire, and was later illegally discharged for 
union organizing, was eligible for neither back pay nor rein-
statement.98 Relying explicitly on the employer sanctions and 
document fraud provisions of IRCA,99 the Supreme Court over-
turned decades of decisions by state and federal courts and agen-
cies by exempting employers of undocumented workers from 
back pay liability. “We hold that [back pay under the NLRA] is 
foreclosed by federal immigration policy, as expressed by Con-
gress in the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 
(IRCA),” declared Chief Justice Rehnquist for the Court.100 The 
extensive legislative history demonstrating a congressional in-
tent to preserve full labor protections for undocumented workers, 
lest employer incentives to hire them increase and the entire 
immigration-deterrent function of IRCA be undermined, did not 
trouble the Hoffman majority.101 Since the Hoffman decision, 
lower courts and state and federal agencies have generally con-
formed to the conclusion that IRCA renders employers exempt 
from ordinary labor or employment liability,102 albeit with some 
exceptions.103 
  
 97 535 US 137 (2002). 
 98 Id at 142. 
 99 Id at 148 (“[IRCA] makes it a crime for an unauthorized alien . . . [to] tender[] 
fraudulent documents.”); id at 149 (“What matters here . . . is that Congress has expressly 
made it criminally punishable for an alien to obtain employment with false documents.”); 
id at 151 (“We therefore conclude that allowing the Board to award backpay to illegal 
aliens would unduly trench upon explicit statutory prohibitions critical to federal immi-
gration policy, as expressed in IRCA.”). 
 100 Id at 140. 
 101 The majority dispensed with the legislative history in a footnote. See Hoffman, 535 
US at 149 n 4. 
 102 See, for example, Sanchez v Eagle Alloy Inc, 658 NW2d 510 (Mich App 2003) (un-
documented worker injured on job ineligible for wage-loss benefits under state worker 
compensation law); Reinforced Earth Co v Workers’ Comp Appeal Board, 810 A2d 99 (Pa 
2002) (same); NLRB Office of the General Counsel, Procedures and Remedies for Dis-
criminatees Who May Be Undocumented Aliens after Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 
MEMORANDUM GC 02-06 § C(1)/3 (July 19, 2002) (NLRB General Counsel conclusion 
that, even where employer knowingly hires undocumented worker, employer is immune 
from back pay liability under NLRA), available at <http://www.nlrb.gov/shared_files/ 
GC%20Memos/2002/gc02-06.html> (last visited Feb 9, 2007). 
 103 See, for example, Rivera v NIBCO, Inc, 364 F3d 1057 (9th Cir 2004) (Hoffman may 
not apply to Title VII cases); Rosa v Partners in Progress, Inc, 868 A2d 994 (NH 2005) 
(undocumented workers remain eligible for workers’ compensation benefits); Balbuena v 
IDR Realty LLC, 812 N.Y.S.2d 416 (NY 2006) (same as to benefits pursuant to state Scaf-
folding Law). 
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Apart from IRCA’s formal exclusion of undocumented work-
ers from the mainstream of labor and employment protections, as 
discerned by the Supreme Court in Hoffman, the decision and 
statute have deterred immigrants from communicating with la-
bor and employment agencies about unlawful activity they have 
suffered or witnessed. IRCA has thus pushed more people deeper 
into the shadows, weakening or severing the civic ties that would 
otherwise connect millions of immigrants to agencies and offi-
cials whose public mission has nothing at all to do with immigra-
tion enforcement.104 The social consequences of this phenomena 
reach more broadly than the undocumented immigrants them-
selves, extending to their families, co-workers, neighbors, unions, 
and other workers.105 
F. Unfair Business Competition 
IRCA has also caused inevitable changes in business prac-
tices. In cost-sensitive, labor-intensive industries that rely on 
low-wage workers, employers who obey labor and immigration 
laws are at a competitive disadvantage with firms that hire un-
documented workers and violate labor standards laws. Because 
the risk of being fined for an IRCA violation is slight and the 
cost-savings from employing and exploiting an undocumented 
worker potentially substantial (all the more so since Hoffman), 
unscrupulous employers have not hesitated to hire undocu-
mented workers and to seize the unfair competitive advantage 
such a practice allows.106 
This unfair competition effect was foreseeable and evident 
even in the early years after IRCA’s passage.107 After the passage 
of IRCA, many agricultural employers swiftly increased the use 
of farm labor contractors, who would be responsible for “compli-
ance” with employer sanctions. In reality, these contractors 
  
 104 See, for example, Wishnie, Right to Petition at 673–79 (cited in note 9). 
 105 Id. at 669, 673, 723, 736 (arguing that law enforcement policies that deter nonciti-
zens from reporting crime and other illegal activities are unwise and may violate First 
Amendment right to petition the government for redress of grievances). 
 106 See Brief Amici Curiae of Employers and Employer Organizations in Support of 
the NLRB, Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc v NLRB, No 00-1595, *7–9 (US filed Dec 10, 
2001) (for 535 US 137) (available on Westlaw at 2001 WL 1631729) (demonstrating that 
outlaw businesses prefer to hire and exploit undocumented immigrants so as to obtain 
unfair competitive advantage over law-abiding employers). 
 107 See, for example, Michael Fix, Toward an Uncertain Future: The Repeal or Reform 
of Sanctions in the 1990s, in Fix, ed, The Paper Curtain at 303, 318–19 (cited in note 29) 
(“in markets where law-abiding and law-evading firms compete with one another, the 
latter may come to enjoy an increased cost advantage”). 
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would simply bear the risk of any sanctions enforcement action, 
while supplying a labor force of undocumented workers that the 
large employer was free to exploit.108 
In the years since IRCA, reliance on labor contractors, sub-
contractors, and contingent workers of various kinds has ex-
panded significantly, not only in the agricultural sector, but in 
many other price-competitive, labor-intensive sectors, from build-
ing services to construction to retail sales to computer program-
ming.109 The logic is easy to understand. Large employers seek to 
insulate themselves from IRCA liability while reaping the cost-
savings of using undocumented workers, who face greater practi-
cal and legal impediments to forming unions or enforcing over-
time rules, health and safety regulations, and anti-
discrimination requirements than do U.S. workers.110 
In the resulting race to the bottom, law-abiding employers 
must hire undocumented workers, often indirectly through sub-
contractors, or else suffer the consequences of unfair competition 
with outlaw firms that hire and exploit undocumented workers. 
The Hoffman decision has intensified this dynamic, making it 
absolutely clear that employers of undocumented workers are in 
many instances immune from ordinary labor law liability. Thus 
the demand for undocumented workers continues, while the 
workers themselves now find employment opportunities concen-
trated with sweatshop employers or shadowy subcontractors 
whose entire raison d’être is to insulate mainstream firms from 
IRCA liability. 
III. A DIFFERENT WAY 
Not one immigration-reform proposal offered by the Bush 
Administration, Congress, or outside advocates presently con-
  
 108 Id at 318. 
 109 Consider Catherine Ruckelshaus and Bruce Goldstein, From Orchards to the 
Internet: Confronting Contingent Worker Abuse (National Employment Law Project 2002), 
available at <http://www.nelp.org/docUploads/pub120.pdf> (last visited Feb 9, 2007); 
Jennifer Gordon, Suburban Sweatshops: The Fight for Immigrant Rights (Belknap 2005). 
 110 See, for example, Greg Schneider, Grand Jury, Wal-Mart Probe Hiring of Workers; 
Investigation Focuses on What Executives Knew, Wash Post E01 (Oct 25, 2003) (describing 
grand jury allegations that “Wal-Mart Stores Inc. executives knowingly hired cleaning-
crew contractors that employed illegal immigrants” and noting “one of the ways some 
businesses hold down labor costs is to fill low-rung jobs—such as custodial positions—
with undocumented immigrants, who are afraid to stand up for better wages”); Commer-
cial Cleaning Services, LLC v Colin Serv Sys, 271 F3d 374 (2d Cir 2001) (holding an alle-
gation by a cleaning service that a competitor hired undocumented workers to underbid 
competing firms states a claim under RICO). 
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templates repealing employer sanctions, and nearly all would 
increase penalties for sanctions violations, increase resources 
dedicated to sanctions enforcement, improve online document 
verification systems, or all of the above.111 This makes no sense. 
The policy rationale for sanctions has proved mistaken, and 
there is now a labor/management/Latino/civil rights political 
consensus opposed to sanctions. As feared, sanctions have caused 
employment discrimination, unfair competition, and dramatic 
erosions of the labor rights of immigrants, while conferring a 
broad coercive power on employers, without deterring illegal 
immigration.112 Together this has almost certainly contributed to 
the depression of wages and working conditions for U.S. workers. 
As it turns out, however, the worst feature of IRCA was nei-
ther the widespread discrimination feared by civil rights oppo-
nents nor the creation of onerous paperwork requirements and 
corporate liability dreaded by business opponents. Rather, 
IRCA’s most pernicious consequence has been to strengthen the 
coercive power exercised by exploitative employers over non-
citizens in the workplace, overwhelming any disincentive based 
on the risk of civil penalty and making employment of undocu-
mented workers irresistible in low-wage, labor-intensive indus-
tries. 
First, IRCA has made private employers the instrument of 
immigration enforcement. Employers are empowered to, and by 
law must, inquire into the immigration status of their employees. 
If immigrant workers seek to form a union, demand overtime 
pay, resist sexual harassment, or otherwise defend their inter-
ests in the workplace, employers often insist on “reverifying” 
their documents113 or, more aggressively, request an immigration 
raid to target activist workers.114 
  
 111 See notes 18–21 (describing Bush proposal, House bill, Senate bill, Kennedy-
McCain, Cornyn-Kyl, Tancredo, Jackson-Lee, and MPI Task Force proposals). 
 112 See Bach and Meissner, Employment and Immigration Reform at 291 (cited in note 
53) (acknowledging uncertainty about impact of sanctions but speculating sanctions “may 
have slowed rate of increase of the flow” of illegal immigration). 
 113 See Annie Decker, Comment, Suspending Employers’ Immigration-Related Duties 
During Labor Disputes: A Statutory Proposal, 115 Yale L J 2193, 2195 (2006) (arguing for 
legislative reform to prohibit re-verification during labor dispute). 
 114 See, for example, Montero v INS, 124 F 3d 381, 382 (2d Cir 1997) (employer, in 
response to union organizing campaign, threatened to contact INS and, through its coun-
sel, a former INS official, did contact INS to request raid of its own employees); In re 
Herrera-Priego, USDOJ EOIR (Lamb, IJ, July 10, 2003) (describing employer’s retaliatory 
call to INS to request raid of own factory to punish workers who have filed overtime com-
plaints with state labor agency), available at <http://www.lexisnexis.com/practiceareas/ 
immigration/pdfs/web428.pdf> (last visited Feb 9, 2007). 
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Second, after Hoffman, employers are now de jure exempt 
from ordinary labor liability in many circumstances (previously, 
employers were at best de facto exempt, in light of the reluctance 
of some undocumented workers to file labor complaints). Even 
legislative proposals to “fix” Hoffman by restoring immigrant 
eligibility for backpay under labor and employment laws are in-
adequate,115 because so long as immigration law forbids the em-
ployment of unauthorized immigrants, the traditional make-
whole remedy of reinstatement will be unavailable. 
Third, despite the negligible risk of a money penalty on em-
ployers who violate IRCA, sanctions have spurred an increasing 
reliance on subcontracted labor, beyond the agricultural sector 
where the practice first developed, thereby concentrating un-
documented workers in underground cash economies and un-
regulated industries. 
The coercive power of sanctions enables employers to claim a 
frighteningly sweeping control of the work-life of immigrants. Be-
cause of IRCA, a law-breaking employer may invoke the formi-
dable powers of the government’s law enforcement apparatus to 
terrorize its workers and suppress worker dissent under threat 
of deportation. In this sense, sanctions recall in some respects 
the post-Civil War schemes of peonage and debt bondage, in 
which private landowners invoked the power of the state to en-
force discriminatory and unconscionable labor agreements that 
perpetuated the enslavement of African-Americans after Eman-
cipation. Indeed, some courts have even recognized that an em-
ployer who threatens deportation to control its workforce may be 
violating the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition on involun-
tary servitude,116 a prohibition that an earlier generation of labor 
advocates once invoked as the theoretical and rhetorical founda-
tion for the union movement itself.117 
  
 115 See, for instance, Safe, Orderly, Legal Visas and Enforcement (SOLVE) Act of 
2004, S 2381 (introduced May 2004), HR 4262 (introduced May 2004) sec 321 (backpay 
remedy, but not reinstatement, restored for undocumented immigrants). 
 116 See United States v Kozminski, 487 US 931, 948 (1988) (“it is possible that threat-
ening . . . an immigrant with deportation could constitute the threat of legal coercion that 
induces involuntary servitude”); Majlinger v Cassino Contracting Corp, 802 NYS 2d 56, 
64 (App Div 2d Dept Sept 19, 2005) (concluding that to deny recovery under state law for 
undocumented worker injured in course of employment “may even implicate the constitu-
tional prohibition of involuntary servitude”). 
 117 See James G. Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause: 
Labor and the Shaping of American Constitutional Law, 1921–1957, 102 Colum L Rev 1 
(2002). 
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The remedy is to repeal sanctions and restore mainstream 
labor protections to all covered employees, including reinstate-
ment, regardless of the immigration status of the employee. 
While the proposal may seem counterintuitive, eliminating em-
ployers’ terrible coercive power over undocumented immigrants 
would immediately diminish the incentive to prefer undocu-
mented immigrants over U.S. workers. It would allow undocu-
mented workers to defend their workplace interests far more ef-
fectively, whether by joining unions or reporting labor violations 
to appropriate agencies—thereby raising rather than lowering 
terms and conditions for all workers. Mainstream firms would 
dispense with the shadowy subcontractors and labor contractors. 
The original concerns with sanctions—increased discrimination 
and burdensome paperwork for firms—would be ameliorated. 
Finally, federal immigration authorities would have greater re-
sources to devote to their genuine enforcement priorities.118 And 
because the repeal of sanctions would deprive employers of their 
principal power over undocumented workers, employers would at 
long last have fewer incentives to prefer undocumented workers; 
the “jobs magnet” against which Congress sought to legislate in 
1986 will be weakened, and there will be less illegal immigration. 
The prohibition on employment of unauthorized immigrants 
may have endured largely because of its symbolic value119 and 
because it has offered political protection for officials seeking to 
reform immigration laws in other ways.120 But the sanctions law 
has neither protected U.S. workers nor deterred illegal immigra-
tion. Instead, the sanctions law has undermined both purposes. 
It is time to take a new path. 
  
 118 As Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff recently observed on CNN, 
“Right now, I have got my Border Patrol agents and my immigration agents chasing 
maids and landscapers. I want them to focus on drug dealers and terrorists,” available at 
<http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0705/17/pzn.01.html> (last visited July 2, 
2007). 
 119 See, for example, Peter Schuck, The Great Immigration Debate, Am Prospect (Sept 
21, 1990), available at <http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name= 
ViewPrint&articleId=5313> (last visited Feb 9, 2007) (discussing symbolic power of sanc-
tions because “[i]mmigration threatens Americans’ sense of control by seeming to jeopard-
ize three fundamental values: national autonomy, economic security, and the ‘social con-
tract’ that secures the welfare state”). 
 120 Fix, Toward an Uncertain Future at 323 (cited in note 107) (noting sanctions may 
supply “political ‘cover’ for liberalizing our immigration laws”). 
